--------------------- PatchSet 7319 Date: 2008/02/27 03:19:57 Author: amosjeffries Branch: cleanup Tag: (none) Log: Cleanup: SQUIDHOSTNAMELEN, getfullhostname() unwinding. 1) SQUIDHOSTNAMELEN was I think defined without reference from RFC 1035 or 1123 The constant definition of FQDN == 255 bytes, is updated in RFC 2181. This patch creates a file rfc2181.h for all constants that RFC defines. Allowing many files which previously depended on squid.h or utils.h (duplicate code!) or worse; a local re-definition of the SQUIDHOSTNAMELEN constant to unwrap their squid.h includes. SQUIDHOSTNAMELEN is still provided but should be considered deprecated in favour of RFC2181_MAXHOSTNAMELEN. 2) The above allows complete unwrapping of getfullhostname() dependencies. This is also included in the patch. Adding the getfullhostname.h file to make this utility function completely autonomous regarding squid. 3) Some minor .h dependancy fixes which led to this cleanup. Members: doc/rfc/1-index.txt:1.14->1.14.4.1 doc/rfc/rfc2181.txt:1.1->1.1.2.1 include/rfc1035.h:1.10->1.10.4.1 include/util.h:1.20->1.20.4.1 lib/getfullhostname.c:1.1->1.1.74.1 src/AccessLogEntry.h:1.10->1.10.4.1 src/HierarchyLogEntry.h:1.1->1.1.56.1 src/squid.h:1.43->1.43.2.1 Index: squid3/doc/rfc/1-index.txt =================================================================== RCS file: /cvsroot/squid-sf//squid3/doc/rfc/1-index.txt,v retrieving revision 1.14 retrieving revision 1.14.4.1 diff -u -r1.14 -r1.14.4.1 --- squid3/doc/rfc/1-index.txt 12 Nov 2007 23:51:27 -0000 1.14 +++ squid3/doc/rfc/1-index.txt 27 Feb 2008 03:19:57 -0000 1.14.4.1 @@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ rfc2187.txt Internet Cache Protocol (ICP), version 2 +rfc2181.txt + Clarifications to the DNS Specification + Squid uses a number of constants from the DNS and Host specifications + (RFC 1035, RFC 1123) this defines details on their correct usage. + rfc2227.txt Simple Hit-Metering and Usage-Limiting for HTTP --- /dev/null Wed Mar 5 01:25:46 2008 +++ squid3/doc/rfc/rfc2181.txt Wed Mar 5 01:25:46 2008 @@ -0,0 +1,842 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group R. Elz +Request for Comments: 2181 University of Melbourne +Updates: 1034, 1035, 1123 R. Bush +Category: Standards Track RGnet, Inc. + July 1997 + + + Clarifications to the DNS Specification + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +1. Abstract + + This document considers some areas that have been identified as + problems with the specification of the Domain Name System, and + proposes remedies for the defects identified. Eight separate issues + are considered: + + + IP packet header address usage from multi-homed servers, + + TTLs in sets of records with the same name, class, and type, + + correct handling of zone cuts, + + three minor issues concerning SOA records and their use, + + the precise definition of the Time to Live (TTL) + + Use of the TC (truncated) header bit + + the issue of what is an authoritative, or canonical, name, + + and the issue of what makes a valid DNS label. + + The first six of these are areas where the correct behaviour has been + somewhat unclear, we seek to rectify that. The other two are already + adequately specified, however the specifications seem to be sometimes + ignored. We seek to reinforce the existing specifications. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + + + +Contents + + 1 Abstract ................................................... 1 + 2 Introduction ............................................... 2 + 3 Terminology ................................................ 3 + 4 Server Reply Source Address Selection ...................... 3 + 5 Resource Record Sets ....................................... 4 + 6 Zone Cuts .................................................. 8 + 7 SOA RRs .................................................... 10 + 8 Time to Live (TTL) ......................................... 10 + 9 The TC (truncated) header bit .............................. 11 + 10 Naming issues .............................................. 11 + 11 Name syntax ................................................ 13 + 12 Security Considerations .................................... 14 + 13 References ................................................. 14 + 14 Acknowledgements ........................................... 15 + 15 Authors' Addresses ......................................... 15 + + + + +2. Introduction + + Several problem areas in the Domain Name System specification + [RFC1034, RFC1035] have been noted through the years [RFC1123]. This + document addresses several additional problem areas. The issues here + are independent. Those issues are the question of which source + address a multi-homed DNS server should use when replying to a query, + the issue of differing TTLs for DNS records with the same label, + class and type, and the issue of canonical names, what they are, how + CNAME records relate, what names are legal in what parts of the DNS, + and what is the valid syntax of a DNS name. + + Clarifications to the DNS specification to avoid these problems are + made in this memo. A minor ambiguity in RFC1034 concerned with SOA + records is also corrected, as is one in the definition of the TTL + (Time To Live) and some possible confusion in use of the TC bit. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + +3. Terminology + + This memo does not use the oft used expressions MUST, SHOULD, MAY, or + their negative forms. In some sections it may seem that a + specification is worded mildly, and hence some may infer that the + specification is optional. That is not correct. Anywhere that this + memo suggests that some action should be carried out, or must be + carried out, or that some behaviour is acceptable, or not, that is to + be considered as a fundamental aspect of this specification, + regardless of the specific words used. If some behaviour or action + is truly optional, that will be clearly specified by the text. + +4. Server Reply Source Address Selection + + Most, if not all, DNS clients, expect the address from which a reply + is received to be the same address as that to which the query + eliciting the reply was sent. This is true for servers acting as + clients for the purposes of recursive query resolution, as well as + simple resolver clients. The address, along with the identifier (ID) + in the reply is used for disambiguating replies, and filtering + spurious responses. This may, or may not, have been intended when + the DNS was designed, but is now a fact of life. + + Some multi-homed hosts running DNS servers generate a reply using a + source address that is not the same as the destination address from + the client's request packet. Such replies will be discarded by the + client because the source address of the reply does not match that of + a host to which the client sent the original request. That is, it + appears to be an unsolicited response. + +4.1. UDP Source Address Selection + + To avoid these problems, servers when responding to queries using UDP + must cause the reply to be sent with the source address field in the + IP header set to the address that was in the destination address + field of the IP header of the packet containing the query causing the + response. If this would cause the response to be sent from an IP + address that is not permitted for this purpose, then the response may + be sent from any legal IP address allocated to the server. That + address should be chosen to maximise the possibility that the client + will be able to use it for further queries. Servers configured in + such a way that not all their addresses are equally reachable from + all potential clients need take particular care when responding to + queries sent to anycast, multicast, or similar, addresses. + + + + + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + +4.2. Port Number Selection + + Replies to all queries must be directed to the port from which they + were sent. When queries are received via TCP this is an inherent + part of the transport protocol. For queries received by UDP the + server must take note of the source port and use that as the + destination port in the response. Replies should always be sent from + the port to which they were directed. Except in extraordinary + circumstances, this will be the well known port assigned for DNS + queries [RFC1700]. + +5. Resource Record Sets + + Each DNS Resource Record (RR) has a label, class, type, and data. It + is meaningless for two records to ever have label, class, type and + data all equal - servers should suppress such duplicates if + encountered. It is however possible for most record types to exist + with the same label, class and type, but with different data. Such a + group of records is hereby defined to be a Resource Record Set + (RRSet). + +5.1. Sending RRs from an RRSet + + A query for a specific (or non-specific) label, class, and type, will + always return all records in the associated RRSet - whether that be + one or more RRs. The response must be marked as "truncated" if the + entire RRSet will not fit in the response. + +5.2. TTLs of RRs in an RRSet + + Resource Records also have a time to live (TTL). It is possible for + the RRs in an RRSet to have different TTLs. No uses for this have + been found that cannot be better accomplished in other ways. This + can, however, cause partial replies (not marked "truncated") from a + caching server, where the TTLs for some but not all the RRs in the + RRSet have expired. + + Consequently the use of differing TTLs in an RRSet is hereby + deprecated, the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same. + + Should a client receive a response containing RRs from an RRSet with + differing TTLs, it should treat this as an error. If the RRSet + concerned is from a non-authoritative source for this data, the + client should simply ignore the RRSet, and if the values were + required, seek to acquire them from an authoritative source. Clients + that are configured to send all queries to one, or more, particular + servers should treat those servers as authoritative for this purpose. + Should an authoritative source send such a malformed RRSet, the + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + + client should treat the RRs for all purposes as if all TTLs in the + RRSet had been set to the value of the lowest TTL in the RRSet. In + no case may a server send an RRSet with TTLs not all equal. + +5.3. DNSSEC Special Cases + + Two of the record types added by DNS Security (DNSSEC) [RFC2065] + require special attention when considering the formation of Resource + Record Sets. Those are the SIG and NXT records. It should be noted + that DNS Security is still very new, and there is, as yet, little + experience with it. Readers should be prepared for the information + related to DNSSEC contained in this document to become outdated as + the DNS Security specification matures. + +5.3.1. SIG records and RRSets + + A SIG record provides signature (validation) data for another RRSet + in the DNS. Where a zone has been signed, every RRSet in the zone + will have had a SIG record associated with it. The data type of the + RRSet is included in the data of the SIG RR, to indicate with which + particular RRSet this SIG record is associated. Were the rules above + applied, whenever a SIG record was included with a response to + validate that response, the SIG records for all other RRSets + associated with the appropriate node would also need to be included. + In some cases, this could be a very large number of records, not + helped by their being rather large RRs. + + Thus, it is specifically permitted for the authority section to + contain only those SIG RRs with the "type covered" field equal to the + type field of an answer being returned. However, where SIG records + are being returned in the answer section, in response to a query for + SIG records, or a query for all records associated with a name + (type=ANY) the entire SIG RRSet must be included, as for any other RR + type. + + Servers that receive responses containing SIG records in the + authority section, or (probably incorrectly) as additional data, must + understand that the entire RRSet has almost certainly not been + included. Thus, they must not cache that SIG record in a way that + would permit it to be returned should a query for SIG records be + received at that server. RFC2065 actually requires that SIG queries + be directed only to authoritative servers to avoid the problems that + could be caused here, and while servers exist that do not understand + the special properties of SIG records, this will remain necessary. + However, careful design of SIG record processing in new + implementations should permit this restriction to be relaxed in the + future, so resolvers do not need to treat SIG record queries + specially. + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + + It has been occasionally stated that a received request for a SIG + record should be forwarded to an authoritative server, rather than + being answered from data in the cache. This is not necessary - a + server that has the knowledge of SIG as a special case for processing + this way would be better to correctly cache SIG records, taking into + account their characteristics. Then the server can determine when it + is safe to reply from the cache, and when the answer is not available + and the query must be forwarded. + +5.3.2. NXT RRs + + Next Resource Records (NXT) are even more peculiar. There will only + ever be one NXT record in a zone for a particular label, so + superficially, the RRSet problem is trivial. However, at a zone cut, + both the parent zone, and the child zone (superzone and subzone in + RFC2065 terminology) will have NXT records for the same name. Those + two NXT records do not form an RRSet, even where both zones are + housed at the same server. NXT RRSets always contain just a single + RR. Where both NXT records are visible, two RRSets exist. However, + servers are not required to treat this as a special case when + receiving NXT records in a response. They may elect to notice the + existence of two different NXT RRSets, and treat that as they would + two different RRSets of any other type. That is, cache one, and + ignore the other. Security aware servers will need to correctly + process the NXT record in the received response though. + +5.4. Receiving RRSets + + Servers must never merge RRs from a response with RRs in their cache + to form an RRSet. If a response contains data that would form an + RRSet with data in a server's cache the server must either ignore the + RRs in the response, or discard the entire RRSet currently in the + cache, as appropriate. Consequently the issue of TTLs varying + between the cache and a response does not cause concern, one will be + ignored. That is, one of the data sets is always incorrect if the + data from an answer differs from the data in the cache. The + challenge for the server is to determine which of the data sets is + correct, if one is, and retain that, while ignoring the other. Note + that if a server receives an answer containing an RRSet that is + identical to that in its cache, with the possible exception of the + TTL value, it may, optionally, update the TTL in its cache with the + TTL of the received answer. It should do this if the received answer + would be considered more authoritative (as discussed in the next + section) than the previously cached answer. + + + + + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + +5.4.1. Ranking data + + When considering whether to accept an RRSet in a reply, or retain an + RRSet already in its cache instead, a server should consider the + relative likely trustworthiness of the various data. An + authoritative answer from a reply should replace cached data that had + been obtained from additional information in an earlier reply. + However additional information from a reply will be ignored if the + cache contains data from an authoritative answer or a zone file. + + The accuracy of data available is assumed from its source. + Trustworthiness shall be, in order from most to least: + + + Data from a primary zone file, other than glue data, + + Data from a zone transfer, other than glue, + + The authoritative data included in the answer section of an + authoritative reply. + + Data from the authority section of an authoritative answer, + + Glue from a primary zone, or glue from a zone transfer, + + Data from the answer section of a non-authoritative answer, and + non-authoritative data from the answer section of authoritative + answers, + + Additional information from an authoritative answer, + Data from the authority section of a non-authoritative answer, + Additional information from non-authoritative answers. + + Note that the answer section of an authoritative answer normally + contains only authoritative data. However when the name sought is an + alias (see section 10.1.1) only the record describing that alias is + necessarily authoritative. Clients should assume that other records + may have come from the server's cache. Where authoritative answers + are required, the client should query again, using the canonical name + associated with the alias. + + Unauthenticated RRs received and cached from the least trustworthy of + those groupings, that is data from the additional data section, and + data from the authority section of a non-authoritative answer, should + not be cached in such a way that they would ever be returned as + answers to a received query. They may be returned as additional + information where appropriate. Ignoring this would allow the + trustworthiness of relatively untrustworthy data to be increased + without cause or excuse. + + When DNS security [RFC2065] is in use, and an authenticated reply has + been received and verified, the data thus authenticated shall be + considered more trustworthy than unauthenticated data of the same + type. Note that throughout this document, "authoritative" means a + reply with the AA bit set. DNSSEC uses trusted chains of SIG and KEY + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + + records to determine the authenticity of data, the AA bit is almost + irrelevant. However DNSSEC aware servers must still correctly set + the AA bit in responses to enable correct operation with servers that + are not security aware (almost all currently). + + Note that, glue excluded, it is impossible for data from two + correctly configured primary zone files, two correctly configured + secondary zones (data from zone transfers) or data from correctly + configured primary and secondary zones to ever conflict. Where glue + for the same name exists in multiple zones, and differs in value, the + nameserver should select data from a primary zone file in preference + to secondary, but otherwise may choose any single set of such data. + Choosing that which appears to come from a source nearer the + authoritative data source may make sense where that can be + determined. Choosing primary data over secondary allows the source + of incorrect glue data to be discovered more readily, when a problem + with such data exists. Where a server can detect from two zone files + that one or more are incorrectly configured, so as to create + conflicts, it should refuse to load the zones determined to be + erroneous, and issue suitable diagnostics. + + "Glue" above includes any record in a zone file that is not properly + part of that zone, including nameserver records of delegated sub- + zones (NS records), address records that accompany those NS records + (A, AAAA, etc), and any other stray data that might appear. + +5.5. Sending RRSets (reprise) + + A Resource Record Set should only be included once in any DNS reply. + It may occur in any of the Answer, Authority, or Additional + Information sections, as required. However it should not be repeated + in the same, or any other, section, except where explicitly required + by a specification. For example, an AXFR response requires the SOA + record (always an RRSet containing a single RR) be both the first and + last record of the reply. Where duplicates are required this way, + the TTL transmitted in each case must be the same. + +6. Zone Cuts + + The DNS tree is divided into "zones", which are collections of + domains that are treated as a unit for certain management purposes. + Zones are delimited by "zone cuts". Each zone cut separates a + "child" zone (below the cut) from a "parent" zone (above the cut). + The domain name that appears at the top of a zone (just below the cut + that separates the zone from its parent) is called the zone's + "origin". The name of the zone is the same as the name of the domain + at the zone's origin. Each zone comprises that subset of the DNS + tree that is at or below the zone's origin, and that is above the + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + + cuts that separate the zone from its children (if any). The + existence of a zone cut is indicated in the parent zone by the + existence of NS records specifying the origin of the child zone. A + child zone does not contain any explicit reference to its parent. + +6.1. Zone authority + + The authoritative servers for a zone are enumerated in the NS records + for the origin of the zone, which, along with a Start of Authority + (SOA) record are the mandatory records in every zone. Such a server + is authoritative for all resource records in a zone that are not in + another zone. The NS records that indicate a zone cut are the + property of the child zone created, as are any other records for the + origin of that child zone, or any sub-domains of it. A server for a + zone should not return authoritative answers for queries related to + names in another zone, which includes the NS, and perhaps A, records + at a zone cut, unless it also happens to be a server for the other + zone. + + Other than the DNSSEC cases mentioned immediately below, servers + should ignore data other than NS records, and necessary A records to + locate the servers listed in the NS records, that may happen to be + configured in a zone at a zone cut. + +6.2. DNSSEC issues + + The DNS security mechanisms [RFC2065] complicate this somewhat, as + some of the new resource record types added are very unusual when + compared with other DNS RRs. In particular the NXT ("next") RR type + contains information about which names exist in a zone, and hence + which do not, and thus must necessarily relate to the zone in which + it exists. The same domain name may have different NXT records in + the parent zone and the child zone, and both are valid, and are not + an RRSet. See also section 5.3.2. + + Since NXT records are intended to be automatically generated, rather + than configured by DNS operators, servers may, but are not required + to, retain all differing NXT records they receive regardless of the + rules in section 5.4. + + For a secure parent zone to securely indicate that a subzone is + insecure, DNSSEC requires that a KEY RR indicating that the subzone + is insecure, and the parent zone's authenticating SIG RR(s) be + present in the parent zone, as they by definition cannot be in the + subzone. Where a subzone is secure, the KEY and SIG records will be + present, and authoritative, in that zone, but should also always be + present in the parent zone (if secure). + + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + + Note that in none of these cases should a server for the parent zone, + not also being a server for the subzone, set the AA bit in any + response for a label at a zone cut. + +7. SOA RRs + + Three minor issues concerning the Start of Zone of Authority (SOA) + Resource Record need some clarification. + +7.1. Placement of SOA RRs in authoritative answers + + RFC1034, in section 3.7, indicates that the authority section of an + authoritative answer may contain the SOA record for the zone from + which the answer was obtained. When discussing negative caching, + RFC1034 section 4.3.4 refers to this technique but mentions the + additional section of the response. The former is correct, as is + implied by the example shown in section 6.2.5 of RFC1034. SOA + records, if added, are to be placed in the authority section. + +7.2. TTLs on SOA RRs + + It may be observed that in section 3.2.1 of RFC1035, which defines + the format of a Resource Record, that the definition of the TTL field + contains a throw away line which states that the TTL of an SOA record + should always be sent as zero to prevent caching. This is mentioned + nowhere else, and has not generally been implemented. + Implementations should not assume that SOA records will have a TTL of + zero, nor are they required to send SOA records with a TTL of zero. + +7.3. The SOA.MNAME field + + It is quite clear in the specifications, yet seems to have been + widely ignored, that the MNAME field of the SOA record should contain + the name of the primary (master) server for the zone identified by + the SOA. It should not contain the name of the zone itself. That + information would be useless, as to discover it, one needs to start + with the domain name of the SOA record - that is the name of the + zone. + +8. Time to Live (TTL) + + The definition of values appropriate to the TTL field in STD 13 is + not as clear as it could be, with respect to how many significant + bits exist, and whether the value is signed or unsigned. It is + hereby specified that a TTL value is an unsigned number, with a + minimum value of 0, and a maximum value of 2147483647. That is, a + maximum of 2^31 - 1. When transmitted, this value shall be encoded + in the less significant 31 bits of the 32 bit TTL field, with the + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + + most significant, or sign, bit set to zero. + + Implementations should treat TTL values received with the most + significant bit set as if the entire value received was zero. + + Implementations are always free to place an upper bound on any TTL + received, and treat any larger values as if they were that upper + bound. The TTL specifies a maximum time to live, not a mandatory + time to live. + +9. The TC (truncated) header bit + + The TC bit should be set in responses only when an RRSet is required + as a part of the response, but could not be included in its entirety. + The TC bit should not be set merely because some extra information + could have been included, but there was insufficient room. This + includes the results of additional section processing. In such cases + the entire RRSet that will not fit in the response should be omitted, + and the reply sent as is, with the TC bit clear. If the recipient of + the reply needs the omitted data, it can construct a query for that + data and send that separately. + + Where TC is set, the partial RRSet that would not completely fit may + be left in the response. When a DNS client receives a reply with TC + set, it should ignore that response, and query again, using a + mechanism, such as a TCP connection, that will permit larger replies. + +10. Naming issues + + It has sometimes been inferred from some sections of the DNS + specification [RFC1034, RFC1035] that a host, or perhaps an interface + of a host, is permitted exactly one authoritative, or official, name, + called the canonical name. There is no such requirement in the DNS. + +10.1. CNAME resource records + + The DNS CNAME ("canonical name") record exists to provide the + canonical name associated with an alias name. There may be only one + such canonical name for any one alias. That name should generally be + a name that exists elsewhere in the DNS, though there are some rare + applications for aliases with the accompanying canonical name + undefined in the DNS. An alias name (label of a CNAME record) may, + if DNSSEC is in use, have SIG, NXT, and KEY RRs, but may have no + other data. That is, for any label in the DNS (any domain name) + exactly one of the following is true: + + + + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + + + one CNAME record exists, optionally accompanied by SIG, NXT, and + KEY RRs, + + one or more records exist, none being CNAME records, + + the name exists, but has no associated RRs of any type, + + the name does not exist at all. + +10.1.1. CNAME terminology + + It has been traditional to refer to the label of a CNAME record as "a + CNAME". This is unfortunate, as "CNAME" is an abbreviation of + "canonical name", and the label of a CNAME record is most certainly + not a canonical name. It is, however, an entrenched usage. Care + must therefore be taken to be very clear whether the label, or the + value (the canonical name) of a CNAME resource record is intended. + In this document, the label of a CNAME resource record will always be + referred to as an alias. + +10.2. PTR records + + Confusion about canonical names has lead to a belief that a PTR + record should have exactly one RR in its RRSet. This is incorrect, + the relevant section of RFC1034 (section 3.6.2) indicates that the + value of a PTR record should be a canonical name. That is, it should + not be an alias. There is no implication in that section that only + one PTR record is permitted for a name. No such restriction should + be inferred. + + Note that while the value of a PTR record must not be an alias, there + is no requirement that the process of resolving a PTR record not + encounter any aliases. The label that is being looked up for a PTR + value might have a CNAME record. That is, it might be an alias. The + value of that CNAME RR, if not another alias, which it should not be, + will give the location where the PTR record is found. That record + gives the result of the PTR type lookup. This final result, the + value of the PTR RR, is the label which must not be an alias. + +10.3. MX and NS records + + The domain name used as the value of a NS resource record, or part of + the value of a MX resource record must not be an alias. Not only is + the specification clear on this point, but using an alias in either + of these positions neither works as well as might be hoped, nor well + fulfills the ambition that may have led to this approach. This + domain name must have as its value one or more address records. + Currently those will be A records, however in the future other record + types giving addressing information may be acceptable. It can also + have other RRs, but never a CNAME RR. + + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + + Searching for either NS or MX records causes "additional section + processing" in which address records associated with the value of the + record sought are appended to the answer. This helps avoid needless + extra queries that are easily anticipated when the first was made. + + Additional section processing does not include CNAME records, let + alone the address records that may be associated with the canonical + name derived from the alias. Thus, if an alias is used as the value + of an NS or MX record, no address will be returned with the NS or MX + value. This can cause extra queries, and extra network burden, on + every query. It is trivial for the DNS administrator to avoid this + by resolving the alias and placing the canonical name directly in the + affected record just once when it is updated or installed. In some + particular hard cases the lack of the additional section address + records in the results of a NS lookup can cause the request to fail. + +11. Name syntax + + Occasionally it is assumed that the Domain Name System serves only + the purpose of mapping Internet host names to data, and mapping + Internet addresses to host names. This is not correct, the DNS is a + general (if somewhat limited) hierarchical database, and can store + almost any kind of data, for almost any purpose. + + The DNS itself places only one restriction on the particular labels + that can be used to identify resource records. That one restriction + relates to the length of the label and the full name. The length of + any one label is limited to between 1 and 63 octets. A full domain + name is limited to 255 octets (including the separators). The zero + length full name is defined as representing the root of the DNS tree, + and is typically written and displayed as ".". Those restrictions + aside, any binary string whatever can be used as the label of any + resource record. Similarly, any binary string can serve as the value + of any record that includes a domain name as some or all of its value + (SOA, NS, MX, PTR, CNAME, and any others that may be added). + Implementations of the DNS protocols must not place any restrictions + on the labels that can be used. In particular, DNS servers must not + refuse to serve a zone because it contains labels that might not be + acceptable to some DNS client programs. A DNS server may be + configurable to issue warnings when loading, or even to refuse to + load, a primary zone containing labels that might be considered + questionable, however this should not happen by default. + + Note however, that the various applications that make use of DNS data + can have restrictions imposed on what particular values are + acceptable in their environment. For example, that any binary label + can have an MX record does not imply that any binary name can be used + as the host part of an e-mail address. Clients of the DNS can impose + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + + whatever restrictions are appropriate to their circumstances on the + values they use as keys for DNS lookup requests, and on the values + returned by the DNS. If the client has such restrictions, it is + solely responsible for validating the data from the DNS to ensure + that it conforms before it makes any use of that data. + + See also [RFC1123] section 6.1.3.5. + +12. Security Considerations + + This document does not consider security. + + In particular, nothing in section 4 is any way related to, or useful + for, any security related purposes. + + Section 5.4.1 is also not related to security. Security of DNS data + will be obtained by the Secure DNS [RFC2065], which is mostly + orthogonal to this memo. + + It is not believed that anything in this document adds to any + security issues that may exist with the DNS, nor does it do anything + to that will necessarily lessen them. Correct implementation of the + clarifications in this document might play some small part in + limiting the spread of non-malicious bad data in the DNS, but only + DNSSEC can help with deliberate attempts to subvert DNS data. + +13. References + + [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities", + STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. + + [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Implementation and + Specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. + + [RFC1123] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - application + and support", STD 3, RFC 1123, January 1989. + + [RFC1700] Reynolds, J., Postel, J., "Assigned Numbers", + STD 2, RFC 1700, October 1994. + + [RFC2065] Eastlake, D., Kaufman, C., "Domain Name System Security + Extensions", RFC 2065, January 1997. + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2181 Clarifications to the DNS Specification July 1997 + + +14. Acknowledgements + + This memo arose from discussions in the DNSIND working group of the + IETF in 1995 and 1996, the members of that working group are largely + responsible for the ideas captured herein. Particular thanks to + Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd, and Olafur Gudmundsson, for help with the + DNSSEC issues in this document, and to John Gilmore for pointing out + where the clarifications were not necessarily clarifying. Bob Halley + suggested clarifying the placement of SOA records in authoritative + answers, and provided the references. Michael Patton, as usual, and + Mark Andrews, Alan Barrett and Stan Barber provided much assistance + with many details. Josh Littlefield helped make sure that the + clarifications didn't cause problems in some irritating corner cases. + +15. Authors' Addresses + + Robert Elz + Computer Science + University of Melbourne + Parkville, Victoria, 3052 + Australia. + + EMail: kre@munnari.OZ.AU + + + Randy Bush + RGnet, Inc. + 5147 Crystal Springs Drive NE + Bainbridge Island, Washington, 98110 + United States. + + EMail: randy@psg.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Bush Standards Track [Page 15] Index: squid3/include/rfc1035.h =================================================================== RCS file: /cvsroot/squid-sf//squid3/include/rfc1035.h,v retrieving revision 1.10 retrieving revision 1.10.4.1 diff -u -r1.10 -r1.10.4.1 --- squid3/include/rfc1035.h 11 Jan 2008 03:50:54 -0000 1.10 +++ squid3/include/rfc1035.h 27 Feb 2008 03:19:57 -0000 1.10.4.1 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * $Id: rfc1035.h,v 1.10 2008/01/11 03:50:54 squidadm Exp $ + * $Id: rfc1035.h,v 1.10.4.1 2008/02/27 03:19:57 amosjeffries Exp $ * * AUTHOR: Duane Wessels * @@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111, USA. * */ - #ifndef SQUID_RFC1035_H #define SQUID_RFC1035_H #include "config.h" + #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif @@ -45,8 +45,19 @@ #include #endif -/* rfc1035 - DNS */ -#define RFC1035_MAXHOSTNAMESZ 256 +#include "rfc2181.h" + +/** + \par RFC 1035 Section 3.1: + * To simplify implementations, the total length of a domain name (i.e., + * label octets and label length octets) is restricted to 255 octets or + * less. + *\par + * Clarified by RFC 2181 Section 11. (RFC2181_MAXHOSTNAMELEN) + */ +#define RFC1035_MAXHOSTNAMESZ RFC2181_MAXHOSTNAMELEN + + typedef struct _rfc1035_rr rfc1035_rr; struct _rfc1035_rr { char name[RFC1035_MAXHOSTNAMESZ]; @@ -56,12 +67,14 @@ unsigned short rdlength; char *rdata; }; + typedef struct _rfc1035_query rfc1035_query; struct _rfc1035_query { char name[RFC1035_MAXHOSTNAMESZ]; unsigned short qtype; unsigned short qclass; }; + typedef struct _rfc1035_message rfc1035_message; struct _rfc1035_message { unsigned short id; Index: squid3/include/util.h =================================================================== RCS file: /cvsroot/squid-sf//squid3/include/util.h,v retrieving revision 1.20 retrieving revision 1.20.4.1 diff -u -r1.20 -r1.20.4.1 --- squid3/include/util.h 14 Dec 2007 23:50:56 -0000 1.20 +++ squid3/include/util.h 27 Feb 2008 03:19:57 -0000 1.20.4.1 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * $Id: util.h,v 1.20 2007/12/14 23:50:56 squidadm Exp $ + * $Id: util.h,v 1.20.4.1 2008/02/27 03:19:57 amosjeffries Exp $ * * AUTHOR: Harvest Derived * @@ -49,15 +49,10 @@ #include #endif -#if !defined(SQUIDHOSTNAMELEN) -#define SQUIDHOSTNAMELEN 256 -#endif - #if defined(_SQUID_FREEBSD_) #define _etext etext #endif -SQUIDCEXTERN const char *getfullhostname(void); SQUIDCEXTERN const char *mkhttpdlogtime(const time_t *); SQUIDCEXTERN const char *mkrfc1123(time_t); SQUIDCEXTERN char *uudecode(const char *); Index: squid3/lib/getfullhostname.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvsroot/squid-sf//squid3/lib/getfullhostname.c,v retrieving revision 1.1 retrieving revision 1.1.74.1 diff -u -r1.1 -r1.1.74.1 --- squid3/lib/getfullhostname.c 14 Oct 2002 00:18:18 -0000 1.1 +++ squid3/lib/getfullhostname.c 27 Feb 2008 03:19:57 -0000 1.1.74.1 @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ - /* - * $Id: getfullhostname.c,v 1.1 2002/10/14 00:18:18 squidadm Exp $ + * $Id: getfullhostname.c,v 1.1.74.1 2008/02/27 03:19:57 amosjeffries Exp $ * * DEBUG: * AUTHOR: Harvest Derived @@ -32,9 +31,9 @@ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111, USA. * */ +#include "getfullhostname.h" -#include "config.h" - +#if 0 /* we SHOULD NOT need ALL these here. */ #if HAVE_LIBC_H #include #endif @@ -62,30 +61,43 @@ #if HAVE_ARPA_INET_H #include #endif + +#endif // 0 + + +#if HAVE_UNISTD_H +/* for gethostname() function */ +#include +#endif #if HAVE_NETDB_H && !defined(_SQUID_NETDB_H_) /* protect on NEXTSTEP */ #define _SQUID_NETDB_H_ +/* for gethostbyname() */ #include #endif -#if HAVE_UNISTD_H -#include -#endif +/* for RFC 2181 constants */ +#include "rfc2181.h" + +/* for xstrncpy() - may need breakign out of there. */ #include "util.h" -/* - * getfullhostname() - Returns the fully qualified name of the current - * host, or NULL on error. Pointer is only valid until the next call - * to the gethost*() functions. +/** + \retval NULL An error occured. + \retval * The fully qualified name (FQDN) of the current host. + * Pointer is only valid until the next call to the gethost*() functions. + * + \todo Make this a squid String result so the duration limit is flexible. */ const char * getfullhostname(void) { const struct hostent *hp = NULL; - static char buf[SQUIDHOSTNAMELEN + 1]; + static char buf[RFC2181_MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1]; - if (gethostname(buf, SQUIDHOSTNAMELEN) < 0) + if (gethostname(buf, RFC2181_MAXHOSTNAMELEN) < 0) return NULL; + /** \todo convert this to a xgetaddrinfo() call */ if ((hp = gethostbyname(buf)) != NULL) - xstrncpy(buf, hp->h_name, SQUIDHOSTNAMELEN); + xstrncpy(buf, hp->h_name, RFC2181_MAXHOSTNAMELEN); return buf; } Index: squid3/src/AccessLogEntry.h =================================================================== RCS file: /cvsroot/squid-sf//squid3/src/AccessLogEntry.h,v retrieving revision 1.10 retrieving revision 1.10.4.1 diff -u -r1.10 -r1.10.4.1 --- squid3/src/AccessLogEntry.h 20 Jan 2008 09:50:56 -0000 1.10 +++ squid3/src/AccessLogEntry.h 27 Feb 2008 03:19:57 -0000 1.10.4.1 @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ - /* - * $Id: AccessLogEntry.h,v 1.10 2008/01/20 09:50:56 squidadm Exp $ + * $Id: AccessLogEntry.h,v 1.10.4.1 2008/02/27 03:19:57 amosjeffries Exp $ * * * SQUID Web Proxy Cache http://www.squid-cache.org/ @@ -31,13 +30,13 @@ * * Copyright (c) 2003, Robert Collins */ - #ifndef SQUID_HTTPACCESSLOGENTRY_H #define SQUID_HTTPACCESSLOGENTRY_H #include "HttpVersion.h" #include "HierarchyLogEntry.h" #include "IPAddress.h" +#include "HttpRequestMethod.h" /* forward decls */ @@ -126,6 +125,8 @@ headers; + // Why is this a sub-class and not a set of real "private:" fields? + // It looks like its duplicating HTTPRequestMethod anyway! class Private { Index: squid3/src/HierarchyLogEntry.h =================================================================== RCS file: /cvsroot/squid-sf//squid3/src/HierarchyLogEntry.h,v retrieving revision 1.1 retrieving revision 1.1.56.1 diff -u -r1.1 -r1.1.56.1 --- squid3/src/HierarchyLogEntry.h 17 Oct 2003 02:12:32 -0000 1.1 +++ squid3/src/HierarchyLogEntry.h 27 Feb 2008 03:19:57 -0000 1.1.56.1 @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ - /* - * $Id: HierarchyLogEntry.h,v 1.1 2003/10/17 02:12:32 squidadm Exp $ + * $Id: HierarchyLogEntry.h,v 1.1.56.1 2008/02/27 03:19:57 amosjeffries Exp $ * * * SQUID Web Proxy Cache http://www.squid-cache.org/ @@ -35,8 +34,12 @@ #ifndef SQUID_HTTPHIERARCHYLOGENTRY_H #define SQUID_HTTPHIERARCHYLOGENTRY_H +#include "rfc2181.h" #include "PingData.h" +/** todo Cleanup: break hier_code type out. We don't need the rest. */ +#include "enums.h" + class HierarchyLogEntry { Index: squid3/src/squid.h =================================================================== RCS file: /cvsroot/squid-sf//squid3/src/squid.h,v retrieving revision 1.43 retrieving revision 1.43.2.1 diff -u -r1.43 -r1.43.2.1 --- squid3/src/squid.h 22 Jan 2008 15:50:57 -0000 1.43 +++ squid3/src/squid.h 27 Feb 2008 03:19:57 -0000 1.43.2.1 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* - * $Id: squid.h,v 1.43 2008/01/22 15:50:57 squidadm Exp $ + * $Id: squid.h,v 1.43.2.1 2008/02/27 03:19:57 amosjeffries Exp $ * * AUTHOR: Duane Wessels * @@ -253,7 +253,9 @@ #include #endif +#if 0 // moved to include/rfc2181.h - RFC defined constants #define SQUIDHOSTNAMELEN 256 +#endif #define SQUID_MAXPATHLEN 256 #ifndef MAXPATHLEN